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This paper analyzes the evolution of regionalism in East Asia and derives implications for the 
role and influence of the United States and Japan in the region.    In the introductory section, 
this paper identifies three major driving forces and three factors that acted as a brake 
throughout the evolutionary process of regionalism. Section 1 analyses the regionalization in 
East Asia to understand the characteristics of the second driving force, intra-regional 
economic interdependence, which has had a consistent and ever-increasing impact on the 
shape and nature of the regionalism. Section 2 reveals changing impacts of different factors 
through an overview of interactions of the driving forces and obstacles through the four 
distinct periods identified in the introductory section. The concluding section deals with the 
interaction between the regionalism and the influence of the United States, Japan and China 
on it. 
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In the past, East Asian governments had distanced itself from preferential trade 
agreements such as free trade agreements (FTAs) and had not actively pursued other formal 
institutions for regional integration (henceforth referred to as “regionalism
1”).  Since  the 
latter half of 1980s, the region had boasted of dynamic growth and de facto economic 
integration through market process (henceforth referred to as “regionalization”) without such 
formal institutions.    In the wake of the Asian financial crisis, however, the landscape 
drastically  changed.  East  Asian  capitals  are  now actively exploring bilateral FTAs and even 
contemplating a vision for “an East Asian community” to promote “peace, prosperity and 
progress” through “cooperation in the economic, political, security, environmental, social, 
cultural, and educational arenas.”(East Asia Vision Group, 2001)    While the change might 
look abrupt, it had been gradually prepared before the financial crisis.     
This paper analyzes the evolution of regionalism in East Asia and derives implications 
for the role and influence of the United States and Japan in the region.    In doing so, this 
paper identifies three major driving forces and three factors that acted as a brake.
2  T h e  
                                                  
1  The word “regionalism” occasionally used to emphasize negative, marchantilistic attitude 
of the members of regional arrangements that narrow-mindedly pursue interests of the region 
at the expense of other regions or international institutions.    In this paper, however, 
“regionalism” merely refers to institutional frameworks set up by the governments in the 
region to promote regional economic integration.    Various arrangements of regionalism have 
different levels of commitment by the participating governments. The FTA is a solid form of 
regionalism.    On the other hand, regional consultative bodies that do not involve legally 
binding agreements but aim at promoting economic integration among the members are a 
looser form of regionalism. 
2  The analytical framework of the evolutionary process of regionalism in Asia in four states 
with three driving forces and obstacles is based on the approach taken by Munakata(2002).   3
assessment of how important each force or factor was at each stage of the evolutionary 
process helps clarify the degree of influence various actors had in the process and the impact 
of the evolution of regionalism in turn had on their influence.     
The first of the three driving forces is defensive reaction to extra-regional pressures 
(henceforth referred to as “defensive regionalism”).  They  have  two  elements.  One  is 
growing concern about discrimination caused by preferential trade agreements in other 
regions such as the European Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA)(and eventually the Free Trade Area of the  Americas  (FTAA)).  East  Asian  capitals 
felt pressure to somehow counteract and to strengthen their negotiation leverage by forging a 
regional grouping on their own.    This motivation has steadily strengthened over time as the 
trend toward regionalism expanded geographically as well as functionally.    Another element 
of the defensive reaction is East Asian frustration with unilateral approaches by the United 
States and “market fundamentalism” symbolized as “the Washington consensus.”    They felt 
the need for greater negotiation leverage vis-à-vis irreconcilable pressure from the United 
States and U.S.-dominated institutions.    This force does not necessarily work constantly and 
tends to be driven by particular events, such as trade frictions with Washington or initial 
mishandling of the Asian financial crisis. 
The second driving force is the region’s desire to have an effective mechanism for 
cooperation to promote de facto integration and to deal with common challenges (henceforth 
referred to as “intra-regional economic interdependence”).    East Asian economies have an 
incentive to reduce transaction costs among neighbors so as to strengthen economic linkages 
with the high growth areas in the region and to participate in and facilitate dense business 
networks of vertical intra-industry trade in place.    They share such common challenges as 
rapid industrialization as well as institutional transition from developmental states to more 
market oriented economies.    Similar problems in other countries in the region motivate East   4
Asian capitals in sharing their experiences in dealing with them.    There is also a political 
incentive to include less developed neighboring countries in the network of economic 
interdependence so as to promote their economic development and political stability and to 
maintain harmonious diplomatic relations with them.    The political motivation is important 
in defining the boundary of a particular “region” to be covered by an institutional framework.   
It is the intensity of economic interaction, however, that drives the substance and the depth of 
such a framework.    As globalization and technological progress accelerated the changes in 
the regional economic landscape, regional economies came to have stronger incentives to 
create an effective local mechanism (in addition to global institutions) to provide prompt and 
focused solutions to immediate regional problems. 
The third driving force is intra-regional competitive dynamics.  East  Asian 
economies compete with each other for foreign direct investment (FDI) and export markets.   
Once an influential country spearheads in implementing measures to make it more attractive 
to foreign investors and more competitive in export markets, others are prompted to follow 
and nullify its advantages.    This dynamics would, depending on the situation, motivate East 
Asian economies to conduct unilateral and voluntary liberalization of trade and investment as 
well as to conclude preferential trade agreements with economies in and outside the region.     
In spite of these forces, the path to creating an institutional framework in this region 
has never been straightforward due to the following factors.     
The first one is the lack of cohesiveness in the region: diversity in developmental 
stages, political systems, and cultural and religious background as well as the centrifugal 
force of historical antagonism and political rivalry among regional powers.    While some 
aspects of diversity, such as developmental gaps, are instrumental in promoting 
interdependence through complementary economic structures, they made it difficult for East 
Asian economies to pursue institutional frameworks for regional integration at the same pace.   5
The second factor is the regions’ extra-regional dependence, especially on the United 
States as well as U.S. focus in Asia on bilateral relationships as opposed to multilateral 
frameworks (Katzenstein, 1997, 23-27; Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002) and its displeasure, 
explicit or not, with Asian frameworks that did not include it as a member.    East Asian 
economies know that they need to anchor U.S. interests in the region since they need the U.S. 
security presence, U.S. technology and capital, and must accommodate their biggest customer.   
This element offsets the impact of defensive regionalism.    The balance of these two 
–dependence on the United States and defensive regionalism– has been largely determined by 
U.S. policy.    When U.S. policy accommodates East Asian common interests and 
demonstrates a strong commitment to regional stability and prosperity, momentum for 
Asian-only fora through defensive regionalism will likely decrease, and vice versa. 
The third factor is East Asian countries hesitation about institutionalization.    While 
they appreciate problem solving, they exhibit inherent skepticism towards rigid, top-down 
institutions (Katzenstein, 1997, p.27-31).    They also tend to prefer consensus building to 
confrontation.  This  hesitation  has also arisen from the lack of commitment or capacity of 
some economies to follow through politically unpopular measures.    As a result, they tend to 
avoid institutionalization and opt for easier, more flexible and (occasionally) less fundamental 
solutions.    This hesitation offsets the impact of the intra-regional economic interdependence.   
The strength of this hesitation changes depending on the nature of the problems they face as 
well as the availability of alternative solutions.    For example, the strong economic 
performance of East Asian economies until the Asian financial crisis made them confident of 
their economic dynamism and ability to attract FDI through unilateral liberalization of trade 
and investment, without depending on legal frameworks such as FTAs (Hashimoto, 1995a; 
Hashimoto 1995b).    The crisis, however, crashed this confidence.    On the other hand, when 
they are faced with serious regional problems that require effective solutions that are not   6
provided by other fora, institutionalization would gain momentum, including legally binding 
agreements that constrain sovereignty and may have discriminatory effects vis-à-vis 
non-members.    The hesitation also moderated over time as the political voice of the private 
sector that had benefited from liberalization strengthened.    As East Asian economies became 
more mature in dealing with regional frameworks and began to appreciate the efficacy of 
institutional agreements in sending positive signals to foreign investors and giving political 
momentum to domestic reforms, they overcame knee-jerk rejections of institutionalization 
and started choosing the most effective ways to solve particular problems.    Nevertheless, the 
lingering lack of willingness or capacity to thoroughly implement tough measures will put the 
brake on the pace and dilute the substance of future institutionalization efforts. 
An overview of interactions of these driving forces and obstacles through the four 
distinct periods identified in Section 2 reveals changing impacts of different factors.    The 
role of the United States or of Asian governments’ reaction to perceived U.S. policy intentions 
changed from the decisive factor to one of the influential factors in determining the shape of 
regional economic institutions involving East Asia.    At the same time, as the region became 
more exposed to the force of globalization and integrated through business activities including 
those of U.S. corporations (i.e. regionalization), the role of intra-regional economic 
interdependence became more prominent.     
The next section analyses the characteristics of the regionalization in East Asia, which, 
has had a consistent and ever-increasing impact on the shape and nature of the regionalism.   
Section 2 reviews the four distinct stages of the evolution of the regionalism referred to above.   
The concluding section deals with the interaction between the regionalism and the influence 
of the United States, Japan and China on it. 
 
1.  The State of Regionalization in East Asia   7
 
1) Forces and actors 
Regionalization in East Asia has largely been driven by competitive activities of 
businesses and governments under the pressure of globalization and technological progress.   
Global businesses have an economic incentive to choose the most suitable locations for 
particular operations in order to make the entire production process more efficient.    The 
technological progress in transportation, information and communications enabled more 
effective integration and management of production networks at a distance from headquarters 
and expanded the freedom of choice for global businesses as to where to locate what kind of 
operations.  Individual  talent  and capital are also freer to go wherever they can maximize 
their value.    The larger freedom in business locations causes unattractive places to suffer 
from industry hollowing-out and brain drain.    Host governments, in turn, came under strong 
pressure to compete with each other for foreign direct investment (FDI), as well as productive 
resources such as individual talent and capital, as an important driver of economic growth and 
development.    Global institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) have also pushed host governments to liberalize their 
economies.    These dynamics, while not unique to Asia, prepared the environment conducive 
to the creation of production networks that drove regionalization in Asia. 
The sharp appreciation of the yen after the Plaza Accord in 1985 triggered the process 
of regionalization in Asia.    It prompted Japanese firms to relocate their labor-intensive 
production process to lower cost countries, causing a surge in export-oriented FDI to the 
countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).    Manufacturers in newly 
industrializing economies (NIEs) such as Korea and Taiwan followed suite as they suffered 
from the subsequent appreciation of their currencies against the U.S. dollar.    In 1992, when 
Deng Xiaoping clarified the important role of special economic zones during his south China   8
tour, China started to attract FDI, putting competitive pressure on ASEAN countries.    The 
flow of FDI had accumulated manufacturing capacity in the region. 
In the 1990s, world business leaders increasingly perceived East Asian economies as 
attractive investment destinations not only for export-oriented operations but also for 
operations targeted at the local markets.    Particularly in the latter half of 90s, the information 
technology (IT) boom and fierce competition under the shorter lifecycle of technologies and 
falling prices prompted Western newcomers to use Asian production capacities for greater 
production speed and price competitiveness.    In the wake of the Asian financial crisis, lower 
price of corporations and deregulation of foreign capital accelerated cross-border M&As in 
the region.    China’s accession to the WTO made it particularly attractive as an FDI 
destination as investors expected improvements in its investment environment.    Thus, in the 
1990s and especially since late 90s, FDI from the U.S. and Europe increased relative 
importance in such sectors as automobiles, electronics, distribution, and finance in Asia 
(METI, 2001, 6-9; 22-25).    At the same time, Asian economies –not just Hong Kong, the 
largest source of FDI to China, but also Taiwan, Korea and Singapore –increased FDI in 
China (JETRO, 2003a, 181-187).     
 
2) Characteristics 
One of the most significant characteristics of regionalization of trade and investment 
in Asia is the dominant role of production networks.  Technological  innovations  and  the 
elimination of trade and investment barriers referred to above helped reduce the cost and 
enhanced the availability of “a service link” –“a composite of activities such as transportation, 
insurance, telecommunications, quality control, and management coordination to ensure that 
the production blocks interact in the proper manner” (Arndt and Kierzkowski, 2001, 4).   
This opened up new opportunities for “fragmentation” –“the decomposition of production   9
into separable component blocks connected by service links” (Arndt and Kierzkowski, 2001, 
10) across national frontiers.    In particular, the sophistication of the system to numerically 
control manufacturing processes lowered the skill levels needed to perform certain steps of 
the manufacturing process and expanded the room to locate those steps in developing 
economies.   
In addition, the “modularization” of the architecture of products, which is to break up 
a product into subsystems or modules that have common design rules and thus can be 
designed independently yet function together as a whole, became prevalent in the electronics 
industry (Baldwin and Clark, 1997).    Modularization opened up new opportunities for 
suppliers at arms lengths to participate in existing production networks.    This further 
increased the flexibility of choosing the location of production blocks.    Modularization, 
which has lowered the level of coordination necessary to integrate various parts into a final 
product, also made the assembly a low value added step (so-called “smiling curve” 
phenomenon)(RIETI, 2002), prompting foreign companies particularly in the business of 
electronics manufacturing service (EMS) to set up assembly factories in China with an 
inexhaustible supply of cheap labor as well as a cluster of suppliers of low-cost electronics 
parts (Kuroda, 2001, 79-133; Kwan, 2002).    This accelerated China’s integration into 
regional production networks and increasingly made it a new link in them.   
Thus, the accumulation of FDI led to dense production networks within the region, 
where parts and components go back and forth among factories in the region for numerous 
processing and assembly tasks with a tight schedule and a low inventory before being shipped 
to the final markets.    This operation of the production networks has significantly boosted 
intra-regional trade (METI, 2002, 15-16), particularly that of intermediate goods (such as 
parts and materials) which grew faster in the 1990s than that of finished goods (METI, 2001, 
10-11).    The regionalization has turned East Asia into a tight network of economies that   10
operates as the factory of the world, which major economies in the world such as the United 
States and Europe have come to capitalize on to provide their industries with more efficiency 
and their people with lower living costs. 
While businesses have larger freedom in choosing the locations of various production 
blocks, there are industrial clusters where certain types of industries are concentrated.    Once 
an industrial cluster is formed, “agglomeration” of industries in that location tends to be 
accelerated as far as such “centripetal forces” as good access to markets (backward linkages) 
and suppliers (forward linkages) outweigh such “centrifugal forces” as immobility of 
necessary production factors and higher costs due to congestion (“the interaction among scale 
economies, transport costs and factor mobility” determine the balance)(Fujita, Krugman and 
Venables, 2001, 11; 346).    Larger freedom in choosing the locations of various production 
blocks seem to have affected this balance and helped new industrial clusters emerge in a 
relatively short period of time in a location that does not have an existing technological or 
industrial base but has other advantages such as cheap labor, low costs of building new 
factories and easy accessibility. (Kuwahara-a)    In this new environment of “more fluid 
agglomerations”(Kuwahara-a), government policies have larger impact on the formation of 
industrial clusters.    Developing economies in Asia have new incentives to improve the 
attractiveness of their industrial sites through such measures as building transportation and 
communications infrastructure, liberalizing trade and investment regulations, providing tax 
incentives to FDI, and providing better opportunities for education and training for local 
workforce.    In addition to seeking to form industrial clusters on their own, Asian 
governments also adopted policies to strengthen the linkages with high growth areas in their 
neighborhood.    In the 1990s, the governments of more developed members of the ASEAN, 
urged by private companies that had increased their roles in the economies of those countries, 
consciously adopted policies to create complementary relationship within ASEAN and with   11
the emerging economies such as China and Vietnam in order to capitalize on their growth 
potential and to position their countries as a hub in the region (Kuwahara-b).  The  rise  of 
China will continue to prompt ASEAN countries to create industrial structures that are 
complementary to China but could be competitive with each other.    This characteristic of the 
regionalization has motivated governments in the region to become attractive to FDI, and to 
integrate them with the centers of growth in the region, further accelerating the process of 
regionalization. 
Another characteristic of regionalization in East Asia is the highly uneven degree of 
integration in East Asia among the different types of products.    The electronics industry has 
spearheaded in regionalization (METI, 2002, 15-17) due to the increase in “vertical 
intra-industry trade” and intra-product trade of intermediate goods.    On the other hand, 
sectors with higher cost of service links (caused by, for example, the protection by host and 
investing countries) or sectors where the production process is not amenable to fragmentation, 
lag behind.    Agricultural produce, for example, is the case in point (Fukao, Ishido and Ito, 
2003).    On the other hand, Fukao et al (2003) shows that, in Europe, where barriers to 
intra-regional trade are much lower due to institutional market integration, the shares of 
vertical intra-industry trade and horizontal intra-industry trade are higher not only in the trade 
in electrical machinery and general and precision machinery as in East Asia but also in the 
trade of many other manufacturing products such as chemical products, transportation 
machinery, wood and paper products.    The difference between Europe and East Asia 
suggests that East Asia has large room for expansion of intra-industry trade in various 
products (Fukao et al, 2003).    The fact that Japanese farmers are more eager to expand 
export as they see opportunities to sell high-end fruits and rice to increasingly affluent Asian 
consumers suggests that two-way trade or intra-industry trade will expand even in agricultural 
produce (Mainichi Shimbun, July 5, 2003; Yomiuri Shimbun, July 7, 2003).   12
Last but not least, the third characteristic of Asian regionalization is East Asian 
exports’ dependence on final demand from industrial  countries.  Monetary  Authority  of 
Singapore (2003, 64-65) estimates that, in 2001, approximately 78% of export of East Asian 
economies excluding Japan (non-Japan Asia) was directly (64% of total) or indirectly (after 
further processing within non-Japan Asia) (14% of total) bound for markets outside the region, 
using the detailed 1995 Asian Input-output (I-O) tables by Institute of Developing Economies 
(IDE), the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO).    Kim (2002) points out that the 
export growth of non-Japan Asia
3, particularly that of the more developed Asian electronics 
exporters (Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia) has been tightly correlated to U.S. 
investment in information technology and estimates that Asia’s domestic demand, on average, 
accounted for only one-fifth of the total export growth of non-Japan Asia in the 1999-2000 
cyclical expansion.    The integration of export-oriented Asian economies is substantially 
different from that in Europe or North America where the most important markets for the 
participating economies are within the region.    East Asia’s extra-regional dependence 
suggests that the economies in the region have a strong incentive to remain open to other 
regions of the world.    This incentive has informed their efforts for institutionalizing regional 
integration, the immediate goal of which is not to become a self-contained market but rather 
to make production networks in the region more competitive and to become a more attractive 
investment destination. 
 
3) The role of Japanese business networks 
Some argue that Japanese manufacturers, supported by the Japanese government, tried 
to extend their strong relational ties into Asia and that “the regionalization of Japanese 
                                                  
3  Non-Japan Asia includes China, Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia 
and the Philippines.   13
manufacturing has helped block or inhibit structural change” and “is merely preserving the 
status quo.”(Hatch, 2002)    Is the role of Japanese business networks an exception to the 
largely market-driven process of regionalization in East Asia? 
In fact, regionalization of Japanese manufacturing has generally taken place as a 
rational reaction of the more outward-looking segments of the Japanese economy to the 
pressure of global competition, not as a way to preserve the status quo or to export the 
Japanese model to Asia.    This does not mean that all their investment decisions were sound.   
Many Japanese investors made bad decisions particularly during the economic bubble in the 
late 1980s.    Unprofitable investments, however, were mostly retrenched in the wake of the 
Asian financial crisis, if not before.    The long-term relationship between Japanese 
manufacturers and their suppliers, which Hatch (2002) calls “relationalism,” has also been 
based on economic incentives.    They have been dismantling the relationship where it ceased 
to serve the purposes.    Delays in the needed changes were due to inertia, not because of 
some policy intention to preserve relational ties in Japan.    On the other hand, businesses 
have preserved and adjusted the relationship where it continues to make an economic sense.     
In this connection, Fujimoto (2002) articulates an important distinction between the 
“Japanese supplier system” and the “keiretsu network”.    The Japanese supplier system is 
supported by three distinct characteristics; long-term business relationship, competition 
among a small number of suppliers for continuous buildup of capabilities, and outsourcing of 
interrelated works so that suppliers can improve capabilities to integrate those works and thus 
to become better equipped to improve product performance.    The keiretsu network, on the 
other hand, is characterized by equity held by and executives sent from the parent company, 
but it does not necessarily have the functional characteristics of the Japanese supplier system.   
According to him, the Japanese supplier system is well suited for products of “integral 
architecture,” typically the automobile, where the integration of various modules of the   14
product design or the production process is crucial for the performance of the product, and, 
therefore,  its  competitiveness.  Fujimoto  finds that, the essential characteristics of the 
Japanese supplier system have remained intact in the automobile industry in the latter half of 
1990s, when “keiretsu” relations were gradually disintegrated in the Japanese corporate world 
(Kuroki, 2002). 
Moreover, Japanese production networks, once extended to Asia have been going 
through significant changes in order to adapt to the local  situation.  For  example,  while  the 
first-tier part suppliers rarely supply parts to only one assembler even in Japan (Fujimoto, 
2002, 175), it becomes more important for the part suppliers to deal with various assemblers 
operating in Asia to achieve the minimum efficiency scale.    Furthermore, Japanese 
production networks do not consist exclusively of firms owned by Japanese corporations.   
For example, Japanese firms in China are increasing their procurement from Taiwanese, or 
local Chinese suppliers as the quality of their products improve (Kuroda, 2001, 86-94).   
Lack of discretion on the part of local subsidiaries, however, has often caused delay in 
procurement from local suppliers.    The Japanese firms are increasingly aware of the problem 
of slow decision making that prevents them from keeping up with rapidly changing business 
environment in host countries. 
Japanese firms operating in Asia are also aware of necessity to attract highly 
competent local employees.    According to a survey conducted in China, college students 
attach importance to opportunities for development and growth rather than the level of the 
salary in choosing their jobs (ChinaHR.com, 2003).    Kwan (2003) quotes this survey and 
argues that Japanese firms are not popular among Chinese students because local employees 
cannot expect promotion.    This creates a vicious cycle where the inability to attract 
competitive local human resources, in turn, makes it difficult to promote local employees to 
managerial positions and to delegate decision-making authorities to local managers, and thus   15
makes that company less attractive to competent and ambitious people.    A study by JETRO 
(2003) suggests that Japanese companies recognize this problem.    The study shows that 
Japanese subsidiaries in Asia recognize that they need to promote local employees, rather than 
rely on the expensive Japanese expatriates, to the management positions in order to enhance 
their competitiveness.    Nevertheless, many of the Japanese firms have not been able to move 
as fast as they wish.    For example, it is said that many Japanese firms tend to hesitate to 
promote local personnel to the top management position of local subsidiaries worrying about 
possible difficulties in communications between headquarters in Japan and overseas 
subsidiaries due to language barriers or the lack of cultural understanding.    The slow pace of 
change reflects their anxiety about the lack of needed organizational capacities, which could 
not be enhanced overnight, not a misguided intention to preserve the Japanese failing model 
by extending it in Asia. 
It should also be noted that Japanese subsidiaries in Asia did not react to the Asian 
financial crisis in a uniform way.    Fukao (2001) demonstrates with his empirical study on 
Japanese subsidiaries’ response to the Asian financial crisis that the larger the value-added per 
worker of a local subsidiary of a Japanese manufacturer, the more likely it was that the 
affiliate maintained its workforce, and vice versa.    It also shows that the greater the vertical 
corporate network the parent company had in the same host country; the more likely it was 
that its subsidiary kept its workforce.    These results suggest that a subsidiary was more likely 
to receive assistance from its parent or firms within the same corporate network, when it had 
valuable skilled workforce and/or when it was an important part of an active production 
network in the host country.    The result clearly suggests that keiretsu networks were not 
something to be preserved at any cost but have been in fact going through various changes.   
The assistance by the Japanese government to help Japanese corporations maintain their 
operations in Asia in the wake of the crisis did not intend to nor could override business   16
decisions to withdraw from non-viable operations. 
Japanese production networks continue to evolve and transform, as Japanese 
manufacturers struggle to adapt their corporate strategies and capabilities to the competitive 
reality, agile or not.    The role of Japanese production networks does not constitute an 
exception to the market-driven nature of the process of regionalization. 
 
2. The Evolution of institutionalized economic integration in East Asia 
 
Regionalism in Asia has evolved since the mid-1980s in four distinct periods.   
Different forces identified in the introductory section came into play at each stage and 
determined the developments in a particular period, while forces that had been ignored or 
frustrated in a particular period caught up and affected the ensuing developments.    The 
influence of the U.S. policy of promoting globalization in general and liberalization of trade 
and investment in Asia in particular, was initially decisive but reduced its relative weight as a 
result of its success --as it awakened the regional capitals to adapt to globalization in ways 
that would suit their social and economic conditions.    In addition, the lack of consistent 
policy attention of the United States to this part of the world, and to their developmental needs 
in particular, helped diminish U.S. influence in designing regional institutions in East Asia.   
At the same time, Japan, that had set off, in the latter half of 1980s, the regionalization and, in 
late 1990s, the regionalism of East Asia, found itself under increasing pressure from the rest 
of East Asia to restructure its domestic economy and actively integrate itself in the region.     
 
1) 1st Period: Competition and Interaction among Various Proposals 
The first period, between 1985 and 1992, saw active competition among different 
regional framework proposals.    It is in this period that the regionalization discussed in the   17
previous section formed the force of “intra-regional economic interdependence.”     
The first actual stimulus for institutionalized economic integration, however, came 
from the United States in the form of an unofficial proposal of an ASEAN-US FTA (the 
account of Singaporean scholar and diplomat Tommy Koh, quoted in “The Negotiator,” 
channelnewsasia.com, November 23, 2002).    ASEAN was not ready.    In the late 1980s, the 
ideas of bilateral FTAs with Japan, ROK and Taiwan considered in the U.S. policy circles 
(USITC, 1988; USITC, 1989), while not official, arouse considerable concern among Asian 
and Pacific policy makers due to “America’s proclivity toward unilateral trade actions” 
(Funabashi, 1995, 108).    They were also concerned about the regionalism in Europe and 
North  America.   
These concerns, together with the rapid economic growth and the regionalization in 
East Asia, prompted Japan (MITI, 1988; 1989) and Australia to come up with the idea of what 
later became the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).    Unlike MITI’s proposal, the 
Australian proposal initially did not include the United States and Canada.    Also, it was more 
focused on trade liberalization, whereas MITI’s idea was more focused on enlarging the 
economic pie through growth rather than simply liberalizing markets (Funabashi, 1995, 66).   
The two countries did not iron out the substantive difference and instead concentrated on 
soliciting support for the launch of the ministerial meeting.     
In the meantime, the U.S. policy circles had also become more open to the idea of a 
multilateral forum on economic issues in the Asia pacific region (for example, Shultz, 1988).   
Secretary of State James A. Baker, III in the first Bush administration had also been 
considering a multilateral framework on economic issues (personal interview, a former U.S. 
State Department official, Washington, D.C., October 2003).    After Australia accepted the 
U.S. request for its participation, Secretary Baker expressed his support for “a new 
mechanism for multilateral cooperation among the nations of the Pacific Rim.” (Baker, 1989)     18
Thus, the first APEC ministerial meeting was held in Canberra in November 1989.     
In late 1990, frustrated by the difficulties in concluding the Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations and APEC’s apparent inability to check North American regionalism, Malaysian 
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad proposed an “economic bloc” “consisting of ASEAN, 
Indo-China, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea and Japan” “to countervail the other 
trade blocs”(New Straits Times, December 11, 1990; Business Times, December 11, 1990; 
Youngblood, 1991)).    After Japan’s immediate rejection of the notion of a “bloc” and 
China’s suggestion that the initial cooperation should be “loose” (Japan Economic Newswire, 
December 13, 1990), Malaysia clarified that the proposal was “a looser Asian economic 
grouping”, consistent with the GATT (Youngblood, 1991).    After consultation among the 
ASEAN members (AEM, 1991), the proposal was renamed the East Asian Economic 
“Caucus” (EAEC) to avoid further misunderstanding.    Despite these efforts for moderation, 
the proposal met strong objections from Washington (Yoneyama, 1990) as something that 
“draws the line down the Pacific” (State Department, 1991) and undermine APEC. 
While East Asian policy makers did not have compelling interests to promote this idea 
as they felt the need to anchor U.S. interest, the strong U.S. reaction left them with a feeling 
that they should be able to choose for themselves with whom they meet and talk.    There was 
also a feeling that the U.S. reaction was hypocritical given the regionalism it promotes within 
its own hemisphere (Bush, 1990).    The U.S. response on this point was that the proposed 
NAFTA would “not establish common barriers to those outside,” (Baker, 1991a) and therefore 
would not become a “bloc.”    It was not clear, however, why a consultative body would 
undermine APEC when sub-regional FTAs such as NAFTA would not (State Department, 
1991).  
While Malaysia struggled to gain support for its EAEC proposal, ASEAN started a   19
new economic integration initiative, the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)
4 in  1992.  
Concerns about the competition for FDI with Eastern European countries and China and the 
possible loss of ASEAN identity and bargaining power as APEC became more established 
prompted ASEAN members to agree on the first framework of comprehensive regional 
economic integration in East Asia. 
In 1991, China, Chinese Taipei and Hong Kong simultaneously joined APEC and 
significantly boosted the importance of APEC (Baker, 1991b, 6).     
Under the Clinton Administration, the United States renewed its interest in opening up 
Asian markets through APEC.    This began the transition to the second period.     
In this period , the main driving force was the defensive regionalism.    The 
intra-regional economic interdependence stimulated the recognition of the need for some form 
of cooperation to deal with common challenges, but did not play a large role at this point.    At 
the same time, all the three obstacles (the lack of cohesiveness, the U.S. displeasure about 
Asian-only framework, and avoidance of institutionalization) were at work.     
One characteristic of the regionalism in this period is the little focus on substance 
despite an impulse to get together.    With no region-wide framework in place, there was a 
tendency to try to find a single formula that would accommodate everybody’s agenda and to 
focus on its membership. 
 
2) 2nd Period: Primacy of APEC 
                                                  
44  The Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for the ASEAN Free 
Trade Area was signed at the Fourth ASEAN Summit held in Singapore on 27-28 January 
1992. 
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The second period started in 1993 when the United States chaired APEC and ended in 
1997 with the Asian financial crisis.    In this period, APEC came out as the primary vehicle 
for regional cooperation.    Strong U.S. leadership (Clinton, 1993) enhanced the momentum 
for APEC and overcame the residual resistance to pursue trade liberalization within APEC.   
The United States hosted the first leaders’ meeting in Seattle.    The Eminent Persons Group 
tasked to draw up a vision for APEC even suggested a possibility of creating an APEC FTA 
(APEC-EPG, 1993, 1994, 1995).    However, there was no agreement to form an APEC FTA 
because of East Asian economies’ concern about preferential trade arrangements, as well as 
trade liberalization at a pace set by negotiations.    Instead, the leaders adopted the Bogor goal 
of liberalization in 1994 (APEC, 1994) and the Osaka Action Agenda (APEC, 1995), chosing 
a mechanism based on members’ voluntary efforts and peer pressure to achieve the ambitious 
target. 
While APEC became the primary economic forum in the region under strong U.S. 
leadership, it did not fulfill most of the expectations that its members had at the forum’s 
inception.     
First, APEC was not effective in checking the regionalism in America (Summit of the 
Americas, 1994), not to speak of that in Europe.    In addition, U.S. unilateral approach to 
trade frictions had “added to Asian ambivalence about the United States” and the tensions 
between the United States and Asian countries, notably Indonesia, over human rights, worker 
rights, press freedom and so on made Asian countries view the U.S. role in APEC warily 
(Manning and Stern, 1994, 86).     
Second, U.S. desire to open Asian markets was eventually frustrated. The 
implementation of the Bogor goal was left to voluntarism and peer pressure.    The United 
States failed in its attempt, through the initiative of Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization 
(EVSL), to change the modality of trade liberalization in APEC from voluntarism to tariff   21
negotiations.  
Third, the Asian desire for an effective framework of cooperation was not satisfied 
either.    Economic cooperation was given a lower priority in APEC.    Project proposals 
proliferated with few efforts to systematically follow up on them.    Frustration culminated 
when the EVSL was determined to be the primary item on the 1998 APEC agenda in late 
1997, shortly after the eruption of the Asian financial crisis.    In the meantime, Japan and 
ASEAN developed a cooperative framework between them.    In 1992, the ASEAN Economic 
Ministers (AEM) and the Japanese MITI Minister started to hold meetings (AEM-MITI) on 
the fringe of AEM meetings.    The chief objective was to promote the integration within 
ASEAN.    MITI provided technical assistance to the projects under this framework to 
complement existing assistance on a bilateral basis (MITI, 1993).    This framework, however, 
was not effective in reducing Japan’s tariffs on its sensitive items that ASEAN economies 
hoped to export more. 
In the meantime, rapid economic growth in Asia and the establishment of APEC 
stimulated European interest in Asia.    ASEAN played a coordinating role in launching the 
Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) (1996).    ASEM opened up a new opportunity for East Asian 
countries to meet in preparation before meeting with European counterparts, though Chinese 
Taipei and Hong Kong were not included due to the political issues on the ASEM agenda.   
While these forums were not necessarily successful in achieving specific, substantive results, 
they satisfied Asian countries’ desire to try out various types of forums and further promoted 
mutual understanding among them.     
The fundamental problem of APEC was that it grew too fast without solidifying its 
core objectives.    The lessons from APEC experiences are that they cannot expect APEC to 
solve all the problems and should have complementary forums, consisting of smaller 
members whose interests converge.   22
At the same time, APEC has incubated regional cooperation in Asia.    It has brought 
governments and businesses together in the region through many meetings and projects.    It 
has made them aware of common problems, new means of cooperation as well as different 
priorities.    All these experiences laid the groundwork for the next period. 
In this period, the same driving forces that had brought about APEC in the first period 
were at work: a shared desire to enhance leverage against the European Community to prompt 
it to come forward and conclude the Uruguay Round, Asian and Australia’s desire of 
countering (in the case of APEC, by co-opting) U.S. unilateralism, protectionism, and 
intra-hemispheric regionalism, Asian desire to deal with the challenges of development and 
increasing interdependence as well as U.S. and Australian desire to liberalize Asian markets to 
further gain from the deepening interdependence .    However, the United States was less 
patient than it had been in the first period.    It was less prepared to accommodate the diversity 
of the region and the time needed to build a sense of community before achieving tangible 
results they wanted (personal interview, a former U.S. State Department official, Washington, 
D.C., December 2003).    This impatience eventually heightened Asians’ weariness toward the 
U.S. leadership in APEC and prepared for the surge of defensive regionalism in the third 
period. 
 
3) 3rd Period: Dawn of East Asian institutions 
The transition to the third period started with the Asian financial crisis that erupted in 
July 1997.    It changed the landscape and mindset of regional economies in several ways and 
brought about a major turning point for the development of the regionalism in Asia. 
First, East Asian countries were reminded of their interdependence by the “contagion” 
of the currency crisis.    In addition, they perceived that the United States and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), which in itself is seen as a tool of U.S. international economic policy,   23
exacerbated the hardship of the countries hit by the crisis.    This perception, combined with 
the fact that U.S. hedge funds substantially profited from the massive selling of Asian 
currencies, hurt the U.S. image in the region (Munakata, 2003).    The experience of the Asian 
financial crisis convinced East Asian countries that they had to protect their own interests 
since global institutions under the U.S. leadership could not always be counted on.    This 
conviction prompted them to build up foreign reserves and to initiate regional cooperation to 
promote financial stability in Asia and later nurtured a more comprehensive idea of regional 
integration.  Stronger  intra-regional  economic interdependence and defensive regionalism 
were at work. 
Second, there was a loss of self-confidence in Asia’s economic dynamism and a rising 
anxiety about the regionalism elsewhere.  The Asian crisis brought down regional domestic 
markets and focused countries in the region on exports.  They became serious about 
overcoming the discrimination caused by FTAs that they did not belong to.  They started to 
seek FTAs that would strengthen their relations with major markets of the world, not FTAs 
among those hit by the crisis.  This attempt in turn reminded them, especially small and 
medium-sized economies, that their bargaining power largely depended on the attractiveness 
of the entire region to which they belong.  This seemed to create increased momentum for 
FTAs among neighboring economies (Nikkei Business, 2000).    Loss of confidence in Asia’s 
economic dynamism thus strengthened defensive regionalism and reduced the hesitation 
about institutionalization. 
 Third, the crisis aroused a sense of urgency regarding economic reform.  To obtain 
necessary financing from the IMF, it is necessary to implement agreed-upon reform measures.   
Foreign investors also watched with keen interest how far the governments were willing to go.   
The need to restructure domestic economies and attract FDI came heighten their interest in 
FTAs that would lock in domestic reform in legally binding agreements with foreign countries.     24
Thus, the hesitation about institutionalization substantially weakened. 
Fourth, the influence of ASEAN was substantially reduced.    China’s relatively stable 
economic performance throughout the crisis and the surge of FDI into Korea contrasted 
sharply with the collapse of domestic demand and slow progress of economic reform in 
ASEAN.    The shift of gravity to Northeast Asia prompted Singapore to go it alone without 
the other members in strengthening relations with  countries  outside  ASEAN.  Singapore’s 
move set off intra-regional competitive dynamics and further reduced Asian countries’ 
hesitation about institutionalization. 
Fifth, Asian countries’ perception of Japan changed.  Japan lost its attractiveness as 
an economic model (Prestowitz, 1997). The threat of Japanese economic dominance in the 
region disappeared.  Now, Asian countries feared that the Japanese business commitment in 
Asia might decrease.  They were also concerned that Japan’s economic crisis might deepen 
the Asian crisis.    Asian and U.S. senior officials called on Japan to take the responsibility of 
supporting the Asian economic recovery (Rubin, 1998; Summers, 1998).    From the outbreak 
of the crisis, Japanese manufacturers tried to maintain their offshore operations in the region 
and well-trained local employees.  The Japanese government took various measures to aid 
the crisis-hit countries as well as Japanese companies (Munakata, 2001).  Asian countries, 
however, seemed to expect of Japan not just to provide assistance but also to expand imports 
through economic recovery.    Thus, the resistance to an increased Japanese role in the region 
was replaced by the expectation that Japan should lead the region out of the crisis and 
spearhead regional efforts to create stable economic environment.     
Washington became disappointed by the loss of the momentum of APEC.    The 
economic crisis dampened U.S. enthusiasm in Asia.    The focus of U.S. trade policy shifted to 
the negotiations on China’s WTO accession.    Washington also renewed its interest in FTAs 
and floated a “P5 (Project 5)” initiative, a proposal for an FTA among five “like-minded”   25
countries (the United States, Chile, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand).    These 
developments convinced Asian capitals that APEC should not be the only regional framework 
in Asia and there could be other forums that did not involve the United States.     
The common experience of these changes fostered an interest in regional cooperation 
and removed two taboos: East Asia-only forums and preferential trade agreements.   
Suddenly, there was enormous excitement to try various alternatives. 
“ASEAN + 3,” comprising of the governments of ASEAN members, China, Korea 
and Japan, had its first informal leaders’ meeting in December 1997.    After the failure of an 
Asian Monetary Fund, as discussed above, East Asian countries started to develop a network 
of currency swap agreements through the “Chiang Mai Initiative”.     
ASEAN + 3, however, lacked enough cohesiveness to pursue all-East Asian FTA, 
though they later started discussions on such a proposal.    The bilateral FTA seemed to be a 
more practical vehicle of liberalization, a more effective way of avoiding marginalization, and 
a more focused approach to problem solving.     
It was Japan and Korea that first triggered the trend for FTAs.    The two countries, 
changed their long-standing policy of exclusive multilateralism and adopted a multi-track 
policy, where bilateral and regional preferential arrangements complement  the  WTO.  Korea 
chose Chile as its first FTA partner and launched negotiations in September 1999.     
In the meantime, New Zealand proposed to Singapore a bilateral FTA in June 1999 
and the two countries launched negotiations in September 1999.    Singapore, now ready to 
negotiate FTAs independent of ASEAN, proposed to Japan to explore an FTA in December 
1999.   
Japan’s decision to negotiate an FTA with Singapore on October 22, 2000 had an 
energizing effect in and outside  the  region.  Singapore  actively explored the possibility for 
FTAs with the United States, Europe, China and India.    The United States and Singapore   26
unexpectedly announced their intention to negotiate on a bilateral FTA on November 16, 2000, 
at the margin of the APEC leaders’ meeting.    As Asian countries started to pursue FTAs, the 
US “hub and spoke” approach ceased to be a common concern.    Singapore’s moves, while 
resented at first, stimulated other ASEAN members to explore FTAs, both collectively and 
individually, with other countries.     
In summary, the decisive factor in the third period was once again defensive 
regionalism.    At the same time, the contagion of the crisis brought home to East Asian 
countries the high degree of their interdependence.    The freedom of experimenting various 
forums turned the attention of East Asian capitals to the substantive issues they were to deal 
with in each forum, and further enhanced the role of intra-regional economic interdependence. 
 
4) 4th Period: FTA Bandwagon 
The fourth period is characterized by China’s new confidence towards regional 
cooperation and the intra-regional competitive dynamics it accelerated.    Beijing had begun 
paying more attention to Asia since the early 1990s as a way to secure benign international 
environment that would allow China to focus on its domestic economic development.    In 
addition, positive experiences of participating in the APEC processes helped China gradually 
overcome its long-held fear that multilateral frameworks could reduce China’s freedom and 
damage its interests (personal interview, a Chinese official, October 2003).     
It was in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, however, that China became more 
confident and proactive, and the transition to the fourth period  started.  In  mid-1998,  China 
succeeded in projecting an image of a responsible regional power by not devaluing the 
renminbi, albeit for its own interest (Segal, 1998; G. Baker, 1998).    This episode made 
Beijing further confident in its ability to positively shape the regional environment.    It 
actively participated in the ASEAN+3 meetings, reversed its initial cautious attitude to the   27
AMF proposal (Sakakibara, 2000, 182-189) and supported the Chiang Mai initiative at the 
ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers Meeting.  Furthermore,  its  accession to the WTO significantly 
heightened its sense of being a responsible great power. 
From the late 1990s to early 2000, China’s anxiety about its security environment 
spurred its efforts to improve its relations with its neighbors.    Sino-U.S. relations became 
tense in the aftermath of the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999.    The first 
Bush administration’s initial policy of treating China as a strategic competitor further alarmed 
China and prompted it to take precautions against possible U.S. attempts to encircle and 
contain China (Fong, 2003).   
In the area of trade policy, China had wearily watched its neighbors shifting their 
focus to FTAs just when it was preoccupied with the negotiations to accede to the WTO 
(Tsugami, 2003, 210-213).    At the same time, China felt a heightened sense of anxiety 
among ASEAN economies about their economic future.    Their developmental stages are 
close to that of China and their export structures overlap with that of China.    An FTA with 
ASEAN would demonstrate China’s willingness to let ASEAN gain from China’s economic 
growth and help alleviate ASEAN’s anxiety about China’s rise.    An FTA with ASEAN would 
be easier for China than those with developed economies (Munakata, 2003) and help China 
quickly catch up with the regional trend towards FTAs.     
One month after Japan and Singapore announced the launch of FTA negotiations, 
China’s Premier Zhu Rongji proposed to have experts from ASEAN and China jointly look 
into the possibility of establishing a free trade area between them.    Since China completed 
major negotiations for its accession to the WTO in 2000, it has become markedly more active 
in engaging in regional frameworks.    Thus, China’s proposal for an FTA with ASEAN 
marked the start of the period of FTA bandwagon.   
Since its proposal to ASEAN in November 2000, China has moved swiftly.    In   28
October 2001, China and ASEAN completed the joint feasibility study for an FTA, and in 
November 2001, China persuaded ASEAN to agree to establish an ASEAN-China Free Trade 
Area within ten years.    For most of ASEAN members, China’s exports present a competitive 
threat.    Therefore, China’s offer of “early harvest,” where China would reduce tariffs of 
interest to new ASEAN members early on, was important in getting ASEAN on board.    In 
November 2002, China and ASEAN signed the Framework Agreement on ASEAN-China 
Economic Cooperation that would establish a free trade area by 2010 for the older ASEAN 
members and 2015 for the newer members.    In October 2003, beginning with Thailand, 
China started to implement the so-called early harvest measures to eliminate tariffs on some 
fruits and vegetables. 
In the meantime, Japan and Singapore concluded the negotiations in October 2001.   
While Japan’s exclusion of most of the agricultural produce invited the criticism from other 
countries, it was more than an FTA and also had the elements of broad economic cooperation 
to reduce transaction costs and expand bilateral exchanges.    Japanese officials tried to come 
up innovative elements of the agreement, hoping to create a model that FTAs with other 
countries could adopt.    The agreement went into force on November 30, 2002.    Japan also 
started negotiations with Mexico in 2002 and Korea in 2003. 
In January 2002, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro made a trip to ASEAN 
countries, signed the Economic Partnership Agreement with Singapore and proposed an 
Initiative for Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership.    It is widely perceived 
that the agreement between China and ASEAN to negotiate an FTA prompted Japan to move 
in the same direction (People’s Daily Online, October 10, 2003).    In October 2003, Japan 
and ASEAN signed the Framework for Comprehensive Economic Partnership between them 
and plan to start negotiations in 2005.    On a bilateral level, Japan is going to start 
negotiations with Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines in early 2004.   29
Washington also began to pay more attention to the region.    China’s rise with its 
confident regional diplomacy and Japan’s stagnation indicated a potential shift in the regional 
balance of power.    At the same time, a weakened ASEAN led to increased security concerns 
about its turning into a hotbed of terrorism.    In October 2002, the U.S. President Bush 
announced the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (EAI) (White House, 2002).    In May 2003, 
the US-Singapore FTA was signed.    In November 2003, President Bush announced his 
intention to launch FTA negotiations with Thailand (White House, 2003).     
Thus, China’s activism has stimulated competitive impulses in East Asia.     
Bilateral FTAs provided Asian economies with effective measures to address specific 
problems without having to wait for a consensus in a larger group, where not all the members 
share the same sense of urgency regarding particular problems.    Previously, the forum came 
first and the substance was taken up only when it fitted the forum.    Now, substance comes 
first and the forum is tailored to deal with the substance.    Thus, multi-layered approaches 
where bilateral, regional and global frameworks are developed in parallel have been firmly in 
place in East Asia. 
In this period, competitive dynamics became the conspicuous force.    Under the 
surface, however, intra-regional economic interdependence seems to have become the 
dominant force.    So far, competitive dynamics has stimulated constructive responses from 
each other and has remained within the range that it would accommodate and nurture 
intra-regional economic interdependence.    At the same time, the rise of China, the 
availability of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and the availability of various 
alternatives including FTAs substantially diminished defensive regionalism at this point, 
while this motivation is still at work particularly in the area of financial cooperation.    The 
balance between intra-regional competitive dynamics and defensive regionalism does not 
seem to have found a stable equilibrium and would change depending on how major powers   30
interact. 
 
3. The impact of regionalism on the influence of major powers 
 
The previous section revealed the shifting impact of driving forces and obstacles of 
regionalism identified in the introduction.    Defensive regionalism that had been primary 
throughout the first three periods significantly weakened in the fourth  period.  Intra-regional 
economic interdependence consistently grew in importance.    Competitive dynamics that had 
been largely limited to the interaction within ASEAN, emerged in the third period when 
bilateral FTAs became prevalent and has become an important factor in the fourth period. 
This concluding section deals with the question of how this evolutionary process of 
regionalism in turn affected the United States, Japan and China and their influence on the 
shape of the regionalism in Asia. 
The United States promoted globalization and prepared an environment conducive to 
regionalization in Asia.    The U.S. markets, its technology and capital supported Asian 
export-oriented development.    When Asia increasingly looked like an attractive center of 
economic growth in the future, the United States started to explore multilateral institutional 
framework for this region, which would secure U.S. access to regional markets and give the 
United States a meaningful leverage against the European Community.    The U.S. influence 
was decisive and APEC became the primary forum for Asia.    This success, however, did not 
last very long.    Perceived U.S. indifference to developmental concerns, the U.S. pursuit of 
the regionalism in its own hemisphere, and the U.S. attempt to introduce tariff negotiations in 
APEC through EVSL bred discontent among Asian economies with the U.S. leadership in 
APEC.    The surge of defensive regionalism in the wake of the Asian financial crisis further 
diminished the U.S. influence on Asian regionalism.    In the fourth period, the U.S. policy   31
attention came back to the region in response to the competitive dynamics.    Since the 
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, however, Asian countries perceive that the United 
States has been largely preoccupied with the war against terrorism and not been paying as 
much attention to the region as China has.     
Given the constraints of policy resources that could be constantly devoted to local 
issues in Asia, its prevalent skepticism towards the efficacy of development assistance and its 
occasional impatience with the gradual process of institutional changes, it may be difficult to 
expect the United States to maintain constant attention to the entire region.    Then, the United 
States may have relatively less influence on the specific shape of the regional economic order 
in Asia.    Nevertheless, it will remain the only superpower that can shape the regional 
developments critical to its national  interests.  In  addition, through selective involvement, 
the United States can also support building blocks of regional arrangements that could serve 
as a model of advanced rules beyond the WTO and reliable implementation on which to build 
larger institutions.    Moreover, the United States seems to have become more willing to pay 
attention to developmental concerns when it is serious about getting an FTA deal with 
developing countries (USTR, 2003a; 2003b; 2003c).    The United States could show this 
willingness in dealing with Asia, U.S. influence on the process and shape of Asian 
regionalism would strengthen.    Thus, how regionalism in Asia will affect US policy towards 
Asia and how that will in turn affect US influence on Asian regionalism still remain to be 
seen. 
The impact of Asian regionalism has been the strongest and the most profound on 
Japan.    Japan spearheaded the regionalization process, contributed to the creation of APEC 
and encouraged the role of ASEAN as a cohesive regional entity.     
There is, however, a large limitation to Japan’s approach.    Japan’s external policy 
was constrained by its “dual structure” of competitive industries and protected and inefficient   32
industries with the former relied on to earn national wealth to be distributed to the latter.   
With this structure in place, Japan could not be responsive to its neighbors’ requests for 
reducing trade barriers to Japan’s sensitive items.    At the same time, the dual structure has 
become unsustainable as low costs of protecting the weak became prohibitive in a low growth 
environment. 
Incidentally, the Asian financial crisis had a large impact on the thinking of the 
Japanese policy makers.    They recognized the interdependence between Japan and the rest of 
Asia.    Japan’s deeper integration in Asia would revitalize its economy, provide more demand, 
help Asia recover, and let Japan capitalize on Asia’s growth potential, creating a virtuous 
cycle. For Japan to integrate itself in Asia, Japan would have to go through structural reform.   
This thinking paved the way to use FTAs as a new vehicle of reform (Munakata, 2001).    As 
the Japanese policy makers expect political resistance to the liberalization of sensitive sectors, 
they have carefully chosen the country to negotiate an FTA with, so that the perceived 
benefits were large enough to overcome the political resistance involved in each deal.    As a 
result, for example, in the process of negotiations with Mexico, the elimination or reduction 
of sensitive items were put on the table.    While FTA negotiations with Mexico suffered a 
temporary setback, these positive developments were unthinkable just a few years ago.     
At the same time, the Japanese economic system have not yet sufficiently adapted to 
this new competitive reality.    In fact, they cannot change overnight.    For a long time, Japan 
did not have adequate external markets in corporate resources.    The lack of corporate 
executive markets has led to the shortage of general managers and professionals needed for 
corporate restructuring.    The lack of well-functioning labor markets has led to the mismatch 
between skills needed in new sectors and skills of those unemployed, adding to the public 
anxiety about rising unemployment.    The Japanese political system with uneven voting 
power in favor of rural areas has also tended to reinforce the status quo.    While there are   33
signs that indicate fundamental changes in the expectations and orientations of businesses, the 
general public, and the government, the inertia in the economic, social and political structures 
has made Japan’s transformation all the more difficult.     
The new regional developments that Japan’s nascent policy shift has helped set off, are, 
in turn, putting more pressure on Japan to complete its policy shift.    Whether Japan will be 
able to play a more constructive role in the process of Asian regionalism eventually depends 
on whether and how fast Japan will come up with a political consensus to dismantle its dual 
structure. 
The rise of China changed the regional landscape in two ways.  First, China’s new 
role as a link in the production network contributed to the growth of intra-regional trade.  
Second, China became an active player in promoting the regionalism.  The first element 
firmly positioned China as an indispensable member of regional economic frameworks in 
East Asia and reinforced the second element.   
China’s advantage is that it is, for now, free from messy democratic processes and can 
make bold moves once there is a consensus among political  elites.  It  seems to be focused on 
a political agenda of reassuring ASEAN and enjoying the diplomatic good will that the FTA 
with ASEAN has brought about.     
This approach, however, is not without risks.  China is still struggling to implement 
WTO rules in its vast territories where local officials have varying levels of willingness and 
capacity to enforce rules and regulations.    If China fails to faithfully implement FTAs, it will 
lose credibility with the business sector.  Furthermore, Beijing’s focus seems to be shifting 
from pursuing faster economic growth and technological progress to rectifying domestic gaps 
and achieving more equitable development.    This shift in domestic policy focus could affect 
the pace of implementing existing agreements and of taking new initiatives that would 
accelerate the process of the regional and global integration of its economy.  Therefore, the   34
question is when China starts to align its external policies with its domestic capabilities and 
priorities. 
With all these uncertainties, the regionalization and regionalism in Asia are mutually 
reinforcing and transforming the external as well as domestic policy priorities of major 
powers that are willing to engage in this process.  How far they are willing to adapt their 
policies to the demand of the regionalism will have a large impact on their influence on the 
process of regionalism.   35
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